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ABSTRACT The establishment of cloud computing and big data in a wide variety of daily applications
has raised some privacy concerns due to the sensitive nature of some of the processed data. This has
promoted the need to develop data protection techniques, where the storage and all operations are carried out
without disclosing any information. Following this trend, this paper presents a new approach to efficiently
compare variable-length data in the encrypted domain using homomorphic encryption where only encrypted
data is stored or exchanged. The new variable-length-based algorithm is fused with existing fixed-length
techniques in order to obtain increased comparison accuracy. To assess the soundness of the proposed
approach, we evaluate its performance on a particular application: a multi-algorithm biometric template
protection system based on dynamic signatures that complies with the requirements described in the ISO/IEC
24745 standard on biometric information protection. Experiments have been carried out on a publicly
available database and a free implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem to ensure reproducibility and
comparability to other schemes.
INDEX TERMS Privacy, security, homomorphic encryption, template protection, biometrics, signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the volume of data captured and pro-
cessed within cloud platforms has seen a huge increase.
In spite of the numerous advantages offered by cloud comput-
ing, several unresolved security and privacy threats have been
raised. These threats, which include privacy, confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data, are magnified by the vol-
ume, velocity, and variety of Big Data [1]. Therefore, while
one of the fundamental challenges for Big Data is to extract
useful information from large volumes of data, a real-world
concern is that such applications are in many cases related
to sensitive information, such as banking transactions or
medical records [2]. As a consequence, it is of the
utmost importance to protect the privacy of such data
and its owner, developing privacy preserving data services
approaches [3], [4]. In fact, numerous efforts are being
directed towards this end within very diverse areas, including
genomics [5] or drones [6].
One promising approach to achieve privacy preserving
technologies is the use of Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (FHE), which allows for computations to be performed
on ciphertexts, generating encrypted results which decrypt to
plaintexts thatmatch the result of the operations carried out on
the original plaintexts. However, practical implementations of
FHE schemes, which allow for real-time computations, still
remain a big challenge [7]. Therefore, somewhat Homomor-
phic Encryption (HE) schemes, which only allow a limited
subset of operations in the encrypted domain, are nowadays
being introduced into many signal processing based applica-
tions, such as electronic voting, private information retrieval
and private searches [8].
More specifically, HE schemes are used in applications
where it is required to compare data in a privacy enhancing
manner [7], [9]. Such comparison can be established for
fixed-length data, using common distance functions, or using
variable-length data, via more complex algorithms such as
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Dynamic TimeWarping (DTW) [10]. Whereas systems using
fixed-length data are computationally efficient even con-
sidering the overhead introduced by HE, in many cases
they present lower accuracy than systems working with
variable-length representations. To palliate the lower accu-
racy achieved, algorithms such as DTW have been proposed
and implemented in the encrypted domain [11] at the cost of
a big computational overhead, which is not affordable in real-
time applications.
In the present work, we try to tackle those issues by
applying different sub-sampling techniques to the input sig-
nals in order to reduce the computational complexity of the
DTW-based algorithm. Then, in order to compensate for the
reduced comparison accuracy derived from this sub-sampling
process, the results are fused at score level with a time-
efficient approach based on a global fixed-length represen-
tation of the data.
One example of the aforementioned applications is biomet-
ric recognition, which has emerged over the last decades as a
reliable alternative to traditional authentication systems based
on something that we know (i.e., PINs or passwords) or some-
thing that we have (i.e., IDs or tokens) [12]. This is partly
due to the fact that biometric characteristics (e.g., signature,
face or iris) cannot be lost or forgotten. On the down side, bio-
metric information is very sensitive and some concerns have
been raised regarding the privacy of the subjects and the secu-
rity of the systems - it has already been proved that samples
can be recovered from unprotected templates [13]–[16] and
be subsequently used to impersonate genuine subjects [17].
As a consequence, any information leakage resulting from
an inappropriate storage of the derived templates can lead to
severe privacy and security issues. In fact, biometric data is
considered sensitive data in European Union (EU) General
Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 [18], which means that
the use of these data is subjected to the right of privacy
preservation. Biometric templates must be hence protected
in order to prevent any potential leakage of the underlying
information. Among other approaches to biometric template
protection, HE allows to meet the privacy requirements estab-
lished within the ISO/IEC 24745 international standard on
biometric information protection [19] while preserving veri-
fication accuracy [20]–[22].
In order to confirm the validity of the proposed
privacy-preserving comparison scheme, we carry out a thor-
ough security and privacy evaluation of a biometric tem-
plate protection scheme based on the proposed comparison
technique. In particular, we have chosen online handwritten
signatures as biometric modality, which is one of the most
widely spread characteristics due to its traditional legal and
social acceptance. For the evaluation, we follow the frame-
work established in [23], which assesses all requirements
established by the ISO/IEC 24745 standard on biometric
information protection [19] for biometric template protec-
tion (BTP) schemes:
• Irreversibility: given a protected template, it should leak
no biometric information (i.e., it should not be possible
to go back from the template to the biometric sample that
originated it).
• Unlinkability: given two templates protected with dif-
ferent keys (i.e., enrolled in different systems), it should
not be feasible to decide whether they conceal the same
biometric instance.
• Renewability: if one template is lost or stolen, it should
be possible to issue a new one, not matching the old
template.
In addition, and to make the experiments reproducible,
a free implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem1 and
the signature corpus of the publicly available multimodal
BiosecurID database [24] are used.
The main contributions of the article can therefore be
summarised in the following:
• First multi-algorithm approach in the encrypted domain
for fixed- and variable-length data representations, and
its application to the particular case of biometric recog-
nition based on online handwritten signature.
• Improvement of i) the computational complexity of the
approach proposed in [25] and of ii) the verification
accuracy achieved by the system proposed in [26].
• Full evaluation of the proposed multi-algorithm biomet-
ric template protection system according to the ISO/IEC
IS 24745 requirements, following a reproducible exper-
imental protocol.
• First unlinkability analysis of biometric template protec-
tion schemes based on Homomorphic Encryption.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Related
works on biometric template protection are summarised
in Sect. II. Sect. III describes the Paillier cryptosystem.
Sect. IV presents the unprotected comparison scheme. The
protected comparison approach is described in Sect. V, and
the complete biometric verification process to be evaluated is
summarised in Sect. VI. The accuracy, irreversibility, unlink-
ability and complexity overhead of the biometric template
protection scheme are analysed in Sect. VII, and final con-
clusions are drawn in Sect. VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
As mentioned in Sect. I, the ISO/IEC 24745 standard on
biometric information protection [19] establishes three main
requirements for biometric template protection (BTP) sys-
tems (i.e., irreversibility, unlinkability and renewability).
At the same time, verification accuracy of encrypted tem-
plates, verification time and storage requirments should be
maintained with respect to the unprotected data [27].
Fulfilling the aforementioned requirements while minimis-
ing the accuracy degradation is not an easy task. Different
approaches, mostly based on cancelable biometrics (i.e., irre-
versible transformations of the unprotected template which
allow a comparison in the protected domain) or cryptobio-
metrics (i.e., a cryptographic key is either bound or extracted
1Publicly available at http://www.csee.umbc.edu/˜kunliu1/research/
Paillier.html
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from the biometric data) have been proposed in the liter-
ature [28], [29]. More recent approaches based on Homo-
morphic Encryption and Garbled circuits can be classified
within a new class, known as biometrics in the encrypted
domain. Unlike cancelable biometrics, protected templates
can be in this case decrypted with the secret key and re-
encrypted with a different key, thereby granting renewability
with no re-acquisition of the biometric data. On the other
hand, there is no relationship between the biometric data and
the cryptographic key as in biometric cryptosystems, thereby
allowing for a higher level of security.
In the present section, we review the existing BTP schemes
based on signature. For an exhaustive review of works deal-
ing with with cancelable biometrics and cryptobiometrics
template protection for biometric characteristics other than
signature, the reader is referred to [30], [31].
A pioneering research line on BTPs for on-line signa-
ture relies on irreversible transformations that obscure the
extracted features (i.e., cancelable biometrics). Although
these techniques grant in most cases irreversibility, they usu-
ally result in some accuracy degradation. For instance, in the
BioConvolving scheme [32], the original Hidden Markov
Model (HMM) is trained with irreversibly transformed time
sequences. On the other hand, in [33], a function-based on-
line signature template protection system is proposed, where
the time sequences are transformed in an irreversible manner.
Performances degrade over 10% for all scenarios tested.
Another research line that has been studied for the devel-
opment of template protection approaches in on-line signa-
ture is the use of fuzzy-based schemes, which account for
the vast mayority of cryprobiometric systems. For instance,
[34] proposes a fuzzy vault system based on minutiae
extracted from on-line signatures. The fuzzy commitment
paradigm was applied in [35] to a dynamic signature recog-
nition system based on UBM-HMM (Universal Background
Model-HMM), achieving a remarkable verification accuracy.
Similarly, [36] presents a biometric cryptosystem based on
hashes, while a BCH error correcting code and helper data
were used in the scheme described in [37].
The main drawback of these cryptobiometric methods is
that they use Auxiliary Data (AD), which can be exploited in
order to obtain information about the hidden biometric data.
This way, the privacy of the subject is violated, which entails
that the irreversibility requirement is not fully met [38]–[40].
Additionally, as in the case of cancelable biometrics, crypto-
biometric systems usually present a performance degradation
with respect to the original systems relying on unprotected
data.
As an alternative to the aforementioned approaches, secure
multiparty computation and homomorphic cryptosystems can
be used in order to carry out biometric recognition in the
encrypted domain while obtaining results fully comparable
to those yielded by plain data [7], [41]. In particular, cur-
rent approaches to biometrics in the encrypted domain [22]
are based on Garbled Circuits (GC) [42] and Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) [7], [43].
Since efficient implementations of HE schemes are very
recent [44], only a few unimodal biometric systems based
on this protection technology have been proposed so far.
In [21], the authors present a new fingerprint verification sys-
tem based on the FingerCode fixed-length representation of
fingerprints and HE. An improved version of that approach is
suggested in [45]. In [46], Eigenface based templates are pro-
tected with HE. Then, a more efficient approach is presented
in [47] using GCs for the threshold comparison. Furthermore,
the SCiFI project [48] proposes a biometric identification
algorithm specifically designed for a more efficient usage in
secure computation, based on fixed-length templates with a
constant Hamming weight. In [49], a secure iris BTP based
on a combination of HE and GCs is proposed, handling
encrypted iriscodes.
More recently, a general framework for fast and privacy-
preserving distance computation, known as GSHADE and
based on oblivius transfers, is proposed in [50]. In this work,
the authors present particular implementations based on Gar-
bled Circuits for several distance metrics and apply them to
face, iris and fingerprint samples.
Regarding signature-based schemes, in [25] an on-line
signature verification scheme is proposed, based on HE and
a direct comparison of variable length functions extracted
from the input signature. Even if a state-of-the-art verification
accuracy is achieved, each comparison takes approximately
one minute, thereby preventing its use in real time applica-
tions or where restrictions on the amount of exchanged data
are low. On the other hand, a more efficient scheme based
on a fixed-length global representation of the signature is
described in [26]. The main drawback of this last system
is the accuracy degradation with respect to that of more
sophisticated comparison algorithms such as [25].
III. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
Wewill use the following notation in the subsequent sections:
• GXFg = {gx1, . . . , gxf , . . . , gxFg}: unprotected fixed-
length representation, comprising Fg features gxf .
• SXU×Fs : unprotected variable-length representation,
comprising Fs sequences of U time samples. The u-th
point of the sample is an Fs-dimensional vector SX[u] =
sxu = {sxu1 , . . . , sxuFs}. To simplify notation, to refer to
any generic point we will use sx = {sx1, . . . , sxFs}
• The set of both fixed- and variable-length representa-
tions belonging to a single data item (in our experi-
ments one handwritten signature) will be denoted as
FX = {GXFg ,SXU×Fs} (where FX stands for full
representation).
• m and m∗: plain message and its corresponding
ciphertext.
• m∗ = Epk (m, s), where E denotes the encryption func-
tion, s a random number and pk the public key.
• m = Dsk (m∗), where D denotes the decryption function
and sk the private key.
The multi-algorithm comparison strategy proposed in
the present work (described in Sect. V) is based on the
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specific implementation of the HE paradigm proposed by
Paillier in [44]. In particular, all the operations involved
in the similarity score computation are carried out in the
encrypted domain. Therefore, for completeness, some impor-
tant concepts related to the Paillier homomorphic proba-
bilistic encryption scheme are introduced here, as they are
key to the understanding of the proposed privacy-preserving
comparison scheme.
The Paillier cryptosystem is based on the decisional com-
posite residuosity assumption: given a composite n and an
integer z, it is hard to decide whether z is an n-residue
modulo n2. As any other public key encryption scheme,
it requires two separate keys: i) a public key pk = (n, g),
where n = pq with p and q two large prime numbers such
that gcd (pq, (p− 1) (q− 1)) = 1, and g ∈ Z∗n2 ; and ii) a
secret key sk = (λ, µ), where λ = lcm (p− 1, q− 1) and
µ = (gλ mod n2)−1 mod n.
Given a message m ∈ Zn, its encryption is denoted as
m∗ = Epk (m, s) ∈ Z∗n2 , and computed as follows:
m∗ = Epk (m, s) = gm · sn mod n2 (1)
where s ∈ Z∗n is a random number, generated a each encryp-
tion process, and hence providing the probabilistic nature of
the cryptosystem. It should be noted that s is not needed
for decryption, and a single value for s should not be used
multiple times, dince it would decrease the security level of
the system.
Then, in order to decrypt the ciphertext m∗, we have
m = Dsk
(
m∗
) = L (m∗λ mod n2) · µ mod n (2)
where L(t) = (t − 1) /n.
Two properties of Paillier cryptosystem will be used in the
present scheme. First, the product of two ciphertexts, m∗1 and
m∗2, will decrypt to the sum of their corresponding plaintexts:
Dsk
(
m∗1 · m∗2 mod n2
)
= m1 + m2 mod n (3)
Second, an encrypted plaintext, m∗1, raised to a constant l,
will decrypt to the product of the plaintext and the constant:
Dsk
((
m∗1
)l mod n2) = m1 · l mod n (4)
In order to avoid overcomplicated notation, in the descrip-
tion of the algorithm the keys pk and sk , as well as the random
number s, will be omitted. Therefore, a generic cyphertextm∗
will be simply denoted as E (m).
IV. UNPROTECTED MULTI-ALGORITHM COMPARISON
In order to compare variable-length time sequences,
the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm has been
widely used in the literature [10]. More specifically, within
the biometric community, high accuracy rates within the
state-of-the-art have been obtained for different character-
istics, including EEGs [51] or handwritten signatures [25].
However, as mentioned in Sect. I, implementations of DTW
in the encrypted domain show two major drawbacks [25]:
i) the high computational complexity and ii) the increased
storage requirements. Since both aspects are directly linked
to the length of the input signals, these will be sub-sampled
in order to achieve a more efficient system. However, such
an approach may lead to degradation on comparison accu-
racy [52]. In order to minimise that degradation, the proposed
system is based on the combination of two comparison
schemes:
• A variable-length based algorithm, which compares
sub-sampled sequences with the DTW algorithm.
In order to obtain a similarity score between the
probe (SXU×Fs ) and the reference data items (SYV×Fs ),
a cost matrix (PathU×V ), minimizing the Euclidean
distance between sequence points is computed. The
final dissimilarity score is the last cell of the matrix:
SDTW = Path[U ,V ].
• An efficient but less accurate comparison algorithm
based on a global fixed-length descriptor, GX, which
compares the data items in terms of their Euclidean dis-
tance deuc. Therefore, it outputs SGF = d2euc (GX,GY).
Since this representation will comprise information
complementary to that of the sub-sampled sequences
compared with the DTW algorithm, it is expected to pal-
liate the accuracy degradation due to the sub-sampling of
the original signals.
In order to output a single similarity score S, after obtain-
ing both partial scores SGF and SDTW , they need to be
i) normalised to a common range, and ii) fused. For the
normalisation of the individual scores, several approaches
are proposed in [53]. However, it is not possible to imple-
ment most of them in the encrypted domain without increas-
ing the computational overhead. We therefore implement a
different and simpler approach, which achieves the same
accuracy as the min-max rule proposed for unprotected data
in [53].
Without loss of generality, we can assume that
SDTW > SGF . If the opposite is true, both scores need
to be exchanged in the following computations in order to
obtain integer parameters α and β, necessary for the Paillier
cryptosystem. We can then perform the following normalisa-
tion, which in turn can be easily computed in the encrypted
domain (see Sect. V-C):
S ′GF = βSGF ⇒ E
(
S ′GF
) = E (SGF )β (5)
where β, the normalising parameter, is estimated as the aver-
age ratio between SDTW and SGF for genuine comparison
scores.
Lastly, the final score is computed as the weighted sum of
the two partial scores:
S = α · β · SGF + (10− α) · SDTW (6)
where α ∈ [0, 10] is the integer weight applied to the fixed-
length score, SGF , and β is the aforementioned normalising
parameter.
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FIGURE 1. Encrypted DTW. In order to compare the probe SXU×Fs and the reference SYV×Fs data items, the optimal path, depicted
in red, minimizing the Euclidean distance between points, is computed following the DTW algorithm. An encrypted cost matrix, Path
is built in four steps. The last entry of the matrix contains the final encrypted score E
(
SDTW
)
.
V. PROTECTED MULTI-ALGORITHM COMPARISON
As mentioned in Sect. IV, the proposed multi-algorithm
comparison approach is based on the score level fusion of
two different comparison schemes: i) one based on fixed
length global descriptors and the Euclidean distance; ii) a sec-
ond one based on variable-length local descriptors and the
DTW algorithm. Their corresponding implementations in the
encrypted domain and the score level fusion are described in
the following sections.
A. ENCRYPTED EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE
Both unencrypted comparison algorithms (see Sect. IV)
ultimately rely on the Euclidean distance. Given two
F-dimensional points x and y, in the unprotected domain the
Euclidean distance d2euc (x, y), can be computed as
d2euc (x, y) =
F∑
f=1
(
x2f + y2f − 2xf yf
)
(7)
Then, using Eqs. 3 and 4, the encrypted distance can be
directly computed in the encrypted domain without perform-
ing any encryptions in the client (see Sect. VI and Fig. 2 for
more details on the client-server model) as
E
(
d2euc (x, y)
)
=
F∏
f=1
E (1)x
2
f · E
(
y2f
)
· E (yf )−2xf
=
F∏
f=1
(
1∗
)x2f · euc2∗f · (euc1∗f )−2xf (8)
The reference data item (i.e., in biometrics the subject’s
reference template) stored in the encrypted database is thus
defined by the following ciphertexts:
E (Y)euc =
{
1∗
} ∪ {euc1∗f , euc2∗f }Ff=1 (9)
where euc1∗f = E
(
yf
)
and euc2∗f = E
(
y2f
)
.
B. ENCRYPTED VARIABLE-LENGTH DATA
COMPARISON BASED ON DTW
The particular implementation of the encrypted DTW pro-
posed in the present article is shown in Fig. 1. In contrast
to the unencrypted algorithm, all computations are now car-
ried out directly in the encrypted domain. The algorithm
computes an encrypted cost matrix E (PathU×V ), obtained
from a plain probe item SXU×Fs and an encrypted refer-
ence itemE
(
SYV×Fs
)
, minimising the distance between item
data points in terms of their Euclidean distance. The final
encrypted comparison score is the last cell of amatrix, namely
E (SDTW ) = E (Path[U ,V ]). For the computations, Eqs. 3
and 4 are applied to convert the unprotected scheme to the
encrypted domain: summations of plaintexts are substituted
by products, and products of plaintexts by exponentiations.
As it may observed in Fig. 1, in order to compute the
encrypted cost matrix, the encrypted Euclidean distance
between data points will be calculated using Eq. 8. After
initialising the first row and column of the cost matrix
(steps 1 to 3), only three different directions are consid-
ered to the compute the best path at each new cell of the
matrix (step 4). As a consequence, in order to grant the
required privacy to the subject, an additional issue needs to
be solved in the encrypted domain: compute the minimum
between three encrypted values in the E (Path) matrix.
Encrypted Minimum Computation: In order to compute
the minimum between three values, without revealing any
information about the plain values involved to the server,
a two-phase protocol is established:
• The client generates a set of K random values R =
{rmin, r2, . . . , rK }, where rk > rmin for k = 2, . . . ,K .
Then, the values to be minimized (m1,m2,m3) are
obscured by adding rmin to each of them:
E (mi)→ E (mi + rmin) = E (mi) · E (rmin)
for i = 1, 2, 3
8610 VOLUME 5, 2017
M. Gomez-Barrero et al.: Privacy-Preserving Comparison of Variable-Length Data
FIGURE 2. Unprotected vs Protected Biometric Verification. In the unprotected scenario (left), a probe biometric sample is acquired and its
features extracted (FX). The final output is the binary decision D = (S > δ), where S is computed as the similarity distance with respect to the stored
unprotected reference (FY). In the protected scenario (right), all the encrypted data or information flow is depicted in red: E
(
FY
)
and E
(
S
)
.
To further hide those values, K − 1 additional numbers
are generated by i) randomly choosing one of those
original three values (E (mk)) and ii) obscuring it with
the corresponding value in R, rk :
E (mk)→ E (mk) · E (rk) for k = 2, . . . ,K
Therefore, the complete list E (minList) comprises the
aforementioned K + 2 encrypted and obscured values.
• The client then sends the complete list E (minList) to
the authentication server, who decrypts all the values
using its secret key sk , computes the obscured mini-
mum, encrypts it again, and sends it back to the client:
E (minCost + rmin).
Finally, the client can compute the encrypted minimum
value as
E (minCost) = E (minCost + rmin) · E (rmin)−1
For a more detailed description of the algorithm, the inter-
ested reader is referred to [25].
C. ENCRYPTED SCORE LEVEL FUSION
As described in Sect. IV, the two, now protected, individual
scores E (SGF ) and E (SDTW ) need to be fused into a sin-
gle final encrypted score E (S). From Eq. 6, and applying
Eqs. 3 and 4, it follows that the final encrypted score E (S)
can be directly computed from the partial encrypted scores,
E (SGF ) and E (SDTW ):
E (S) = E (SGF )α·β · E (SDTW )10−α (10)
VI. BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION SCHEME
Taking into account the encrypted multi-algorithm compari-
son scheme described in Sect. V, we can define a complete
encrypted verification process applicable to biometric tem-
plate protection. To that end, we first need to define a security
model and then the steps needed to carry out biometric veri-
fication in a privacy-preserving manner under the constraints
of that security model.
A. SECURITY MODEL
In the present section we describe the general security model
considered in this work, including all the assumptions made
regarding the expected behaviour (honest or malicious) of
each of the entities involved in the biometric recognition pro-
cess. This way the reader can have a more general perspective
of how different threats have been taken into account and
how the proposed scheme deals with several privacy and/or
security risks.
First, a general diagram of the unencrypted biometric veri-
fication system is depicted in Fig. 2 (left), where two entities
are involved:
• A client, which will acquire the probe biometric sam-
ple, extract the features and encode them in the tem-
plate FX, generate the similarity score between FX and
the reference template FY, and compute the final gen-
uine/impostor verification decision D = (S > δ), where
δ is the pre-defined verification threshold.
• A server, which will hold the database with the refer-
ence templates FY and send them to the client during
verification.
In order to increase the privacy of the subject, the server
must process the client’s biometric data without disclosing at
any point any unprotected sensitive information, and at the
same time, the server must protect the information stored in
the database [54]. To that end, a different security model is
used in the protected system (see Fig. 2, right) where all the
data, either stored or shared between client and server in the
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FIGURE 3. General diagram of the proposed encrypted verification process. A local client acquires and extracts the features of the probe
signature (SXU×Fs and GXFg ) and computes the encrypted dissimilarity scores (E
(
SGF
)
and E
(
SDTW
)
) between the probe and the reference
signatures (SYV×Fs and GYFg ), in collaboration with the authentication server, which holds the key pair (pk, sk) and outputs the final decision.
The DB server holds the encrypted database. All the encrypted values, either stored or transmitted on the communication channel, are depicted in red.
verification process, should be encrypted. Therefore, the new
entities and roles are the following:
• The client acquires the probe biometric sample, extracts
the template FX and generates the encrypted score E (S)
(see Sect. V), sending it to the authentication server.
• The DB server holds the database comprising only
encrypted templates, and sends the encrypted reference
template E (FY) to the client during verification.
• The authentication server holds the key pair (sk, pk)
and computes the final genuine/impostor decision D.
It should be noted that a single key pair will be used for
all subjects enrolled in the system.
With respect to the security model proposed in other bio-
metric template protection approaches [55], in the present
scheme the sensor and comparator have been integrated into
a single entity: the client. Therefore, the requirements on
the data flow described in [55] to fulfil the aforementioned
irreversibility and unlinkability criteria have been adapted to
the present model as:
• The authentication server should not learn FY or FX.
• The DB server should not learn FY or FX, or trace
subjects.
• The client should not learn FY.
To fulfil those requirements we assume that:
• According to the honest-but-curious adversary
model [56], all parts involved follow the protocols
honestly. As a consequence, we may assume that the
scores computed by the client are correct.
• An adversary may have access to one of the servers, but
the authentication and DB servers will not collude.
More details on the full protected verification process are
described in Sect. VI-B. In addition, a detailed unlinkability
and irreversibility analysis based on this security model is
provided in Sects. VII-E and VII-F, respectively.
B. ENCRYPTED MULTI-ALGORITHM
VERIFICATION PROCESS
Building upon the security model described in Sect. VI-A,
the final encrypted verification process comprises ten
steps (see Fig. 3):
0) During enrolment, the reference templates SY and GY
are acquired, encrypted using the server public key pk
to generate E (SY) and E (GY) (Eq. 1) and finally
stored in the database.
1) The client captures the probe sample and extracts the
templates GX and SX.
2) The client sends to the DB server the encrypted ID,
E (ID), of the client to request the appropriate reference
template E (FY).
3) The DB server sends the encrypted reference templates
E (SY) and E (GY) to the client.
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4) a. The client computes the global features similarity
score, according to Eq. 8, E (SGF ).
Steps 4b to 7 are related to the iterative encrypted
DTW verification algorithm, depicted inside a green
box in Fig. 3. In order to obtain the encrypted score,
E (SDTW ), between de probe template, SXU×Fs , and
the encrypted reference, E
(
SYV×Fs
)
, each value of the
encrypted cost matrix E (Path[u, v]) is computed as
follows (see Fig. 1 and Sect. V-B):
4) b. The client calculates the encrypted Euclidean
distance E
(
d2euc (SX[u],SY[v])
)
according to Eq. 8.
5) If u, v 6= 1 (Fig. 1 step 4), the minimum between
three values is computed following the two step pro-
tocol established above. In this first step, the client
generates an encrypted list of values E (minList) and
sends it to the server.
6) The server decrypts the list using sk , finds the
obscured minimum minCost + rmin and re-encrypts it
with pk .
7) The server sends the re-encrypted minimum
value to the client, setting E (Path[u, v]) =
E (minCost) = E (minCost + rmin) · E (rmin)−1.
8) When the iterative process is finished, the client
computes the fused score E (S) from E (SDTW ) =
E (Path[U ,V ]) and E (SGF ) (Eq. 10).
9) The client then sends E (S) to the authentication server.
10) The authentication server decrypts the score with sk ,
obtaining S.
11) In the last step, the authentication server generates
and outputs the final binary verification decision:
D = (S > δ).
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we analyse whether the proposed protec-
tion scheme fulfils the requirements established within the
ISO/IEC IS 24745 [19]. To that end, all experiments are
carried out on the BiosecurID multimodal database [24],
described in Sect. VII-A, and an implementation of an on-line
signature based verification system, described in Sect. VII-B.
We have analysed the impact of signal sub-sampling on
its accuracy in Sect. VII-C1. Then, for the encrypted
system we additionally analyse: i) accuracy preservation
(Sect. VII-C2), ii) time and storage complexity preser-
vation (Sect. VII-D), iii) irreversibility of the tem-
plates (Sect. VII-E), and iv) unlinkability of the
templates (Sect. VII-F).
A. EXPERIMENTAL ON-LINE SIGNATURE DATABASE
Experiments have been run on the on-line signature sub-
corpus of the BiosecurID database [24], which comprises
data belonging to 400 subjects. Signatures were captured
in four sessions over a four month period with a Wacom
Intuos3 A4/Inking pen tablet, including four genuine sig-
natures and three skilled forgeries per session and sub-
ject. In order to allow comparisons with future studies,
the unprotected templates will be made public through the
http://atvs.ii.uam.es/databases.jsp website.
In addition, two different scenarios are considered:
• Random forgeries: impostor scores are computed com-
paring the subject’s signature to genuine signatures
belonging to other subjects (different from the owner).
In other words, an eventual impostor tries to fool the
system using his own signature.
• Skilled forgeries: impostor scores are computed com-
paring the subject’s signature to imitations of his
own signature made by other subjects, with differ-
ent skill levels. See the database description for more
details [24].
B. UNPROTECTED ON-LINE SIGNATURE
VERIFICATION SYSTEM
For fixed-length verification, as proposed in [57], a set
of 100 global features xf is extracted from the x and y
coordinates, and the pressure signal, and then normalized to
the range [0, 1] using tanh estimators. The best Fg = 40
normalized features according to [58] are selected to form the
final template GX40 = {x1, . . . , x40}. Then, the Euclidean
distance will be used to compute the similarity scores, as it
performs better than the Mahalanobis distance proposed
in [57].
For the identity verification based on variable-length tem-
plates, a subset of Fs = 9 time sequences selected using
the Sequential Forward Floating Selection (SFFS) algorithm
from the total set of functions defined in [57], is directly
compared using DTW [10]. Those time sequences include,
for instance, the horizontal x and vertical y coordinates,
the speed or the pressure.
C. ACCURACY ANALYSIS: UNPROTECTED vs
PROTECTED SYSTEM
As pointed out in a [25], the complexity of the DTW scheme
depends on the square of the number of samples of the
considered signature. Therefore, sub-sampling the signatures
will considerably reduce the time needed for verification as
well as the storage requirements.
As a consequence, the accuracy analysis has a twofold
objective: i) assess the impact of sub-sampling
(Sect. VII-C1) on the verification accuracy of the DTW based
scheme, and ii) select the adequate configuration for the
final system, which will be implemented in the encrypted
domain (Sect. VII-C2. In order to evaluate the accuracy,
the first 350 subjects are enrolled and modelled with the four
signatures captured in the first session, being the samples
of the remaining 50 subjects used for the random forg-
eries comparisons in order to avoid biased results. More
specifically, the first four samples of each subject are used
at enrolment. Then, the remaining 12 samples are used to
compute the genuine scores (350× 12 = 4, 200 scores). The
fifth sample of each of the 50 impostors is compared to the
enrolled models for the random impostor score computation
(350 × 50 = 17, 500 scores). Finally, all 12 skilled forg-
eries are used for the skilled impostor scores (350 × 12 =
4, 200 scores).
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TABLE 1. Accuracy analysis of the two sub-sampling approaches, for different sampling rates, in terms of nSamples and the EER (in %) for the unimodal
unprotected DTW-based scheme and the multi-algorithm approach.
1) SUB-SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
We will consider in the present article two different
approaches for sub-sampling signature sequences:
• Fixed rate: for a given sub-sampling rate sRate, one
out of each sRate samples will be selected (denoted as
1:sRate).
• MaxMin: in this case, first the local maxima and min-
ima of each x and y signals will be computed. Then,
the corresponding samples in all three input signals
(x, y and p) will be retained. Since those are the points
in which the signer changes the direction, they should
contain the most discriminative information of the sig-
nature, thereby providing a minimal loss on verification
accuracy.
2) ACCURACY RESULTS
We now evaluate the performance of the aforementioned
approaches in terms of the average number of samples of the
sub-sampled signatures (nSamples) and the verification accu-
racy of the multi-algorithm based scheme. Details are given
in Table 1, where the Equal Error Rate (ERR) of the DTW
based system (second and third columns), and for the multi-
algorithm system (fourth and fifth columns) are shown for
sub-sampling configuration, as well as for the baseline (first
row), together with the corresponding average number of
samples (nSamples, first column).
As it may be observed, the MaxMin sampling strategy
offers no clear advantages: whereas nSamples is similar to
a fixed rate of sRate = 10, in both the skilled and random
forgeries scenarios MaxMin yields a higher EER (3.99%
vs 3.25% and 14.86% vs 12.31%). Consequently, given its
higher complexity due to the maxima and minima computa-
tion, in the rest of the article we will focus on the fixed rate
sampling strategy.
In this latter case, we may observe that, when only
the DTW scheme is taken into account, accuracy drops
quickly (i.e., the EER increases), specially in the random
forgeries scenario for sRate ≥ 10. Nevertheless, it may
observed on the last two columns of Table 1, where the
performance of the multi-algorithm scheme is analysed, that
the higher sRate, the more effective the fusion with the fixed-
length scheme is. This is due to the fact that the accuracy of
the DTW decreases with sRate, but the fixed-length scheme
remains the same, since those templates are computed on the
original signature, where no sub-sampling has been applied.
In order to grant a low accuracy degradation, in the
following subsections we will consider the schemes with
sRate = {2, 5}, which achieve the lowest EERs as highlighted
in Table 1.
Taking those remarks into account, we evaluate the
accuracy degradation at all operating points. To that end,
the Detection Error Trade-off (DET) curves for sRate =
2 (left) and sRate = 5 (right) are depicted in Fig. 4,
both for the random forgeries (solid lines) and the skilled
forgeries (dashed lines) scenarios. In both cases, the multi-
algorithm based approach (in black) is compared to the
original DTW approach (in grey) where no sub-sampling
is applied. Since verification accuracy is fully preserved at
all operating points, the DET curves of the protected and
unprotected systems overlap completely. Therefore, to make
the figures easier to read, we have only depicted the protected
system DETs.
As it may be observed, accuracy is almost preserved for
sRate = 2, especially in the random forgeries scenario. In the
case of sRate = 5, accuracy is more severely degraded.
More specifically, the EER raises raises 75% and 22%
with respect to the original DTW algorithm for the random
and skilled forgeries, respectively. However, the time and
storage requirements and verification time are considerable
reduced (see Sect. VII-D).
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS: UNPROTECTED vs
PROTECTED SYSTEM
The complexity of the proposed approach is analysed
and compared to the method presented in [25], in terms
of the most costly operations (encryptions, decryptions,
exponentiations and products), the storage requirements,
the amount of data exchanged between server and client,
and the time needed for verification. Results are sum-
marised in Table 2, where experiments have been run on
a machine with an Intel Core i7 with four 2.67 GHz cores
on Java. Since the complexity of the fixed-length system
is negligible with respect to DTW, only the latter will be
analysed.
As indicated in [25], the number of encryptions and
decryptions carried out depends on the square of nSamples.
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FIGURE 4. Accuracy analysis: DET curves of the original unimodal DTW scheme, with no sub-sampling (grey), and for
the proposed multi-algorithm scheme for the corresponding values of sRate (black), considering random
forgeries (solid) or skilled forgeries (dashed).
TABLE 2. Complexity analysis for the proposed scheme, compared to the unimodal DTW-based schemes presented in [25].
The number of operations is showed for the client/server.
Therefore, for sRate = 5, complexity is reduced by 25 times,
thereby enabling a much faster comparison of signatures.
Additionally, it should be noted that the single comparison of
the fixed-length templates can be computed in parallel with
the much more costly DTW-based algorithm, hence requiring
no additional time. These facts lead to a reduction in the time
needed for verification from one minute to approximately
three seconds (0.04 minutes).
In a similar manner, the amount of data either
exchanged or stored in the reference template are reduced
from 864 MB and 3.30 MB in [25], to 36 MB and 0.66 MB,
respectively. Compared to the unprotected verification, where
only 0.01 MB are stored or exchanged, there is still a big gap.
However, current technologies allow a real-time verification
for the proposed multi-algorithm approach, at a small cost in
terms of verification accuracy (see Fig. 4).
E. IRREVERSIBILITY ANALYSIS: PROTECTED SYSTEM
Unlike the analysis of the accuracy and the complexity,
in this case the irreversibility of the unprotected system is
not studied because, by default, unprotected systems have
been proven to be reversible [14]–[16]. That is, in fact, one of
the main purposes of developing a protected system: adding
irreversibility to the original unprotected system, as requested
by the ISO/IEC International Standard 24745 [19].
To grant such irreversibility, and following the security
model described in Sect. VI-A, three different pieces of
information should be hidden: i) only the client can have
access to the plain probe biometric data FX, ii) the plain
reference templates FY should not be seen by any entity,
being only their encrypted version E (FY) stored, and iii) the
plain score S should not be transmitted as it can potentially
be used to perform hill-climbing [59] or inverse-biometrics
attacks [15], [16].
For each distance measure considered, the information
exchanged from the DB server to the client is the encrypted
reference templateE (FY). Given that the decisional compos-
ite residuosity is an NP-hard problem, decoding the templates
without sk could be considered computationally infeasible.
Therefore, since only the authentication server knows the
decryption key, sk , but he has never access to any pro-
tected or unprotected templates, there is no way for the
client or any of the servers to learn any information from
it. Conversely, the client sends no information about the
acquired probe samples FX to any server. We may thus con-
clude that the first requirement established by the ISO/IEC
24745 standard, irreversibility, is met.
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F. UNLINKABILITY AND RENEWABILITY ANALYSIS:
PROTECTED SYSTEM
As in the case of irreversibility, unprotected systems are,
by definition, fully linkable and not renewable, which leads
to a severe information leakage from the subject’s privacy
protection perspective. As a consequence, in this section we
will only analyse if the protected system is able to add unlink-
ability and renewability to the original system, as required by
the ISO/IEC International Standard 24745 [19].
On the one hand, it should be noted that a different key
pair (sk, pk) will be used for each application, and utilised to
encrypt all the information within that particular application.
Therefore, it will provide the desired renewability property:
different protected templates can be generated from a single
sample using different keys. In addition, should a key pair be
compromised, the database can be regenerated by decrypting
and re-encrypting all templates with a new key pair
(
sk ′, pk ′
)
.
Regarding unlinkability, from a theoretic perspective, since
unencrypted distances (i.e., similarity scores) between plain-
texts are not preserved in the encrypted domain, given two
samples M1 and M2 belonging to a given subject, their
corresponding protected templates E
(
FX1
)
and E
(
FX2
)
,
encrypted with the same key at different times (due to the
probabilistic nature of Paillier cryptosystem) or different
keys, are not related. On the other hand, since the Pail-
lier cryptosystem provides semantic security against chosen-
plaintext attacks [60], given a protected template E
(
FX1
)
,
no information can be feasibly derived about the original
unprotected features FX1. That way, no comparison can be
established in the unprotected domain between some kind of
information retrieved from the protected templates.
In addition, only the encrypted ID, E (ID), is shared
between the client and DB server. Such encrypted ID will
have a different value at each attempt due to the probabilistic
nature of the Paillier cryptosystem (see Eq. 1). As a conse-
quence, an eventual eavesdropper will not be able to track
the verification attempts of a single client.
In addition to that theoretical analysis, an experimental
evaluation of the unlinkability of the templates is carried
out, following the unlinkability analysis framework proposed
in [23]. In the following we summarise this evaluation proto-
col, and we referer the reader to [23] for more details on the
computations.
Two templates, E (FX) and E (FY), enrolled in different
applications (and eventually protected with different keys),
are defined as linkable if an eventual attacker can determine
whether they were extracted frommated instances, and hence
conceal a unique identity. Therefore, an eventual attacker
launching a cross-matching attack to take advantage of this
particular vulnerability of the BTP scheme can be assumed
to:
• be in possession of two protected templates, E (FX) and
E (FY), enrolled in different applications,
• following Kerckhoffs’s principle [61], know how the
systemworks and, in particular, theMated instances and
Non-mated instances score distributions.
FIGURE 5. Unlinkability analysis: scores distributions for comparisons
belonging to Mated instances (green) or to Non-mated instances (red).
D↔ (s) (blue) represents the local linkability measure.
To reach his goal of determining whether both protected
templates, E (FX) and E (FY), conceal the same biometric
instance (i.e., they represent different samples of biomet-
ric data extracted from the same biometric instance - e.g.,
the same left index finger), he computes a dissimilarity score
between them, s = DS (E (FX) ,E (FY)). This function will
be defined by the attacker ad-hoc in order to compromise the
unlinkability of the system (i.e., it can be the dissimilarity
score of the system or any other more sophisticated function
to compare the templates and link them). Then, given s, he
will decided whether or not it stems from a mated instances
comparison: if it does, the attack will have succeeded. On the
other hand, if such a positive decision (i.e., both templates
come from the same instance) cannot be made based on the
computed s, the attacker will have failed in his goal.
As a consequence, in order to evaluate the unlinkabiliy of
the templates, the corresponding Mated instances (in green,
and stemming from similarity scores between samples of
the same instance protected with different keys) and Non-
mated instances (in red, and stemming from similarity scores
between samples of different instances protected with differ-
ent keys) score distributions are depicted in Fig. 5. Those
distributions are quantitatively compared in terms of two
different measures:
• Local measure D↔ (s): it evaluates the linkability of the
templates in a score-wise basis. If for a specific score s1,
a system yields D↔ (s1) = 1, it means that, in case a
cross-matching attack produced s1, the attacker would
be able to link both templates E (FX) and E (FY) to
the same instance with almost all certainty. On the other
hand, D↔ (s0) = 0 should be interpreted as full unlinka-
bility for that particular score s0. All intermediate values
of D↔ (s) between 0 and 1 report an increasing degree
of linkability.
• Global measure Dsys↔ : it gives an overall measure of
the linkability of the whole system, independent of the
score domain of the system at hand, thereby allowing
a comparison among different systems. This way, if a
system has Dsys↔ = 1 (i.e., case in which both the Mated
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samples and Non-mated samples distributions have no
overlap), it means that it is fully linkable for all the
scores of the Mated samples distribution domain (i.e.,
where D↔ (s) = 1). Similarly, Dsys↔ = 0 means that the
system is fully unlinkable for the whole score domain,
since both distributions overlap for the whole domain
of scores. All intermediate values of Dsys↔ between
0 and 1 report a decreasing degree of unlinkability (i.e.,
increasing degree of linkability).
In order to compute such metrics, we need to take into
account the key on the success of a cross-matching attack:
determining whether, given a score s, it is more likely that
two templates stem from mated samples, p (Hm|s), than from
non-mated samples, p (Hnm|s). Therefore, such linkability
can be accounted for in terms of the difference of conditional
probabilities of each hypothesis Hm and Hnm for a given
score s:
D↔ (s) = p (Hm|s)− p (Hnm|s) (11)
However, these two conditional probabilities are unknown.
What can be computed a priori, and is known for each system,
are the Mated and Non-mated samples distributions (i.e.,
p (s|Hm) and p (s|Hmn)), that is, the probability of observing
s knowing that two templates belong to mated samples or to
non-mated samples. We can therefore compute Eq. 11 in
terms of the likelihood ratio between these probabilities.
For the global linkability measure, Dsys↔ , we are interested
in measuring how likely it is to get a score stemming from the
Mated samples distribution. This can be achieved computing
the difference p (Hm ∩ s) − p (Hnm ∩ s) and integrating it
over the whole score domain. However, regarding the suc-
cess of cross-matching attacks, we are only interested in the
probabilities stemming from theMated samples distribution.
In addition, as in the definition of the local linkabilitymeasure
D↔ (s), a cross-matching attack will only be successful if
p (Hm|s) > p (Hnm|s). We can hence define Dsys↔ as:
Dsys↔ =
∫ smax
smin
p (s|Hm) · D↔ (s) ds (12)
We have depicted in Fig. 5 the local linkability measure
D↔ (s) in blue. As it may be observed, both mated (green)
and non-mated (red) score distributions overlap completely,
thereby preventing the success of a cross-matching attack:
given a particular score s, the eventual attacker cannot deter-
mine whether the corresponding templates conceal the same
identity. As a consequence, the local linkability measure
D↔ (s) = 0 for all s, which in turn this leads to a global
linkability value of Dsys↔ = 0. We may therefore conclude
that the encrypted templates are fully unlinkable.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a time-efficient, secure and privacy-
preserving comparison scheme based on Homomorphic
Encryption through combination of fixed-length and sub-
sampled variable-length descriptors. As a case study, we have
applied the proposed general approach to an on-line signature
based biometric system, achieving a high accuracy, almost
comparable to that of state-of-the-art unprotected schemes,
at the cost of a reasonably low computational overhead.
A theoretical and empirical analysis of the irreversibility
and unlinkability of the protected templates has been carried
out. The results show that all requirements established within
the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [19] are met. Furthermore, protected
templates are compressed to 20% of the original size and
the amount of exchanged data is reduced to less than 5%
with respect to the original approach [25]. Consequently,
verification in real-time applications is allowed, solving most
of the practical implementation issues detected in the original
approach described in [25].
It should be also noted that, even if only a subsampling
value of 1:5 has been analysed in the case of the protected
system, higher rates can be considered to further reduce ver-
ification time, at the cost of some accuracy degradation (as it
has been seen in the case of the unprotected system). In future
works, we will study how to further improve verification
accuracy using subject-specific thresholds [63] or quality
measures [64].
Finally, regarding the overall security and privacy pro-
tection offered by biometric systems, the reader should
bear in mind that these systems are vulnerable to external
attacks carried out by malicious adversaries, as first stated by
Ratha et al.. Biometric template protection technologies such
as the one proposed in this article are not enough to tackle
all vulnerabilities: additional countermeasures need to be
applied. For instance, Presentation Attacks (PA) refer to the
use of synthetic artifacts or the alteration of someone’s real
biometric charateristics with the goal of either impersonating
another subject or avoid being recognised, according to the
ISO/IEC IS 30107 on Presentation Attack Detection (PAD).
These attacks can be prevented by the addition of PAD tech-
niques. Furthermore, internal modules of the system (e.g.,
feature extractor or comparator) can be overriden with Tro-
jan horses such that they always output the values desired
by the adversary. These attacks can be counterfeited with
secure code execution practices. Similarly, an adversary can
intercept and modify the data being transferred between such
internal modules. A countermeasure for this attack is to use
time-stamps or a challenge/response mechanism.
In this context, note that we defined an informal security
model in Sect. VI-A to analyse some of the benefits of
the proposed methods (e.g., eavesdroppers will obtain no
information about the original biometric data and subject’s
activities cannot be tracked). As future work we foresee the
application of more comprehensive security models [56] to
the proposed approach for privacy-preserving comparison of
variable-length data.
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